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ELEMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS IN ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY 
 
Abstract 
In this article, I consider how ancient Greek philosophical thinking might be 
approached differently if the environmental ethical import that is salient in it is critically 
considered. After pointing out how environmental ethics is generally construed in much 
of the discourse on current philosophical thinking, I spell out some unexplored 
elements of environmental ethical thinking that are implicit in ancient Greek 
philosophy. In the end, I challenge some common notions in Western 
environmentalism that take environmental ethics as a fairly new discourse of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Ultimately, I suggest that ancient Greek 
philosophical thinking ought to be judiciously interpreted from an environmental ethical 
perspective. 
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Introduction 
On the face of it, discourse on environmental ethics seems to be shaped by the 
emergence of current environmental problems that the world is now witnessing such 
as air pollution, water pollution, global warming and climate change (See also O’Neill 
1993: 1; Tangwa 2006: 735 and Boss, 2008: 735). However, it remains to be seen 
whether environmental ethics could be taken as a contemporaryphilosophical 
enterprise that is responding to some of these environmental challenges that are 
currently facing the globe. 
 In this article, I intend to situate environmental ethical thinking within a particular 
epoch in the broad history of Western philosophy. I critically trace and examine how 
some ancient Greek philosophers have considered the question of whether and how 
human beings’ ethical relationship with the natural environment should be construed.     
The justification for situating environmental ethics within the history of ancient 
Greek philosophy is that environmental ethics is a component of applied ethics 
stemming from ethics, broadly conceptualised as propounded in ancient Greek 
thinking. Environmental ethics is also part of environmental philosophy. Hence, in that 
regard, I find it reasonable to situate environmental ethics within the history of Western 
philosophy, particularly in ancient Greek thinking. The other reason for my attempt in 
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situating environmental ethics in history of ancient Greek philosophy is that 
environmental ethics is not merely a contemporary philosophical attempt without an 
antecedent past. So, for these reasons, it is important to assess the background from 
which environmental ethics is coming from. 
In view of such notions, I forward the argument that environmental ethical 
thinking has been intertwined with the general history of ancient Greek philosophy and 
that it has not been critically and elaborately presented in the history of philosophy 
despite a number of ethical philosophers having invaluably contributed to it. I also 
critique the way in which environmental ethics is approached in much of the discourse 
in twentieth century and contemporary philosophical thinking. Above all, my intention 
here will be to show that environmental ethics has traditionally been a component of 
the history of Western Greek philosophical thinking. This is why I maintain the position 
that environmental ethical thinking can meaningfully be traced from classical Greek 
philosophical thinking to contemporary philosophical attempts that seem to downplay 
the antecedent past in terms of influence on environmental ethical thinking.  
I start by defining environmental ethics. In this regard, I endeavour to critically 
examine the various dimensions and understandings of environmental ethics. In this 
pursuit, I intend to come up with a contemporary view and understanding of 
environmental ethics that is largely informed and influenced by the history of Western 
Greek philosophical thinking. In the second section, I highlight some perspectives that 
take environmental ethics to be a new discourse. Lastly, I take a serious attempt to 
critically trace, examine and understand the historical roots and development of 
Western environmental ethics from the ancient philosophical perspectives to 
contemporary views. As I situate environmental ethics in ancient Greek philosophy, I 
seek to critically challenge the thinking that environmental ethics is a relatively new 
ethical discourse of the twentieth century as espoused by most contemporary Western 
thinkers on environmental ethics such as Warwick Fox (2000: 01) and Judith Boss 
(2008: 735). This position is prevalent and shared in contemporary philosophical 
discourses on environmental ethics. 
 
Understanding Environmental Ethics 
The question concerning the ethical relationship that ought to exist between 
human beings and other non-human beings and their surrounding remains at the core 
of Western environmental ethics and African environmental ethics as well. Contrary to 
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Edgar Moscher, Otto Neumaier and Peter Simons’ view that “human beings are not 
the only creatures which have moral standing, and that not only human interests give 
reasons for action” (1998: 09-10), traditionally, human beings have tended to look at 
themselves as the only morally superior creatures on the planet earth. This view is 
based on the assumption that human beings are the only rational animals. It has also 
characterised much of Western philosophical thinking from the classical period to date 
despite some non-anthropocentric attempts to consider environmental ethics as 
worthwhile. Such a view which I will consider here as largely shaping anthropocentric 
environmental ethics has been held and largely influenced by thinkers like Plato, 
Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz. 
While it is reasonable to hold the view that human beings are indeed the only 
creatures on earth that are capable of rational deliberation, such knowledge has 
served to confirm and shape a somewhat anthropocentric thinking in environmental 
ethics. Anthropocentric thinking is basically the assumption and prioritisation of human 
interests at the expense of everything else. According to Edwin Etieyibo, an 
anthropocentric value-system is shaped by the belief that human beings occupy the 
top of the hierarchy of all species and that they are at the centre of the universe 
(Etieyibo, 2011: 52). This assumption could best explain this inherently human-centred 
thinking and approach to environmental ethics that relegates the environment in terms 
of moral consideration as characterising much of modern Western philosophical 
thinking. Making comparisons between Western and African environmental thinking, 
Godfrey Tangwa asserts the view that “the Western world-view can be described as 
predominantly anthropocentric and individualistic, and contrasted with its African 
counterpart which [is] described as eco-bio-communitarian” (Tangwa, 2006: 392). 
Although Tangwa’s argument for African environmental ethics as oriented towards the 
ecosphere, the biosphere and the human community sounds reasonable, to blanket 
all of Western environmental ethics as anthropocentric like what he has done would 
be unfair since elements of non-anthropocentric environmental ethics can be noted in 
Western environmental ethics as well. Also, meaningful environmental ethics is not to 
be found in non-anthropocentric environmental ethics alone. Rather, totally rejecting 
anthropocentric environmental ethics would be unfair and a mistake too. 
Anthropocentric environmental ethics as I trace it in the history of philosophy does not 
entail a total disregard  for the environmental welfare and wellbeing. In essence, 
anthropocentric environmental ethics could sometimes be viewed as safeguarding the 
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needs for both human beings and nature although it prioritises the interests of human 
beings.   
Much of contemporary environmental ethics tries to question the extent to which 
the interests of human communities could be reconciled with those of non-human 
communities. As well, it tries to assess the way in which the interests of future 
generations could be successfully talked of. Environmental ethics tries to address the 
question of how the task of taking into consideration the interests of the current 
generations of humans and their future generations as well as the interests of the 
environment could be reasonably achieved. This approach or form of environmental 
ethics is often informed by anthropocentric thinking that prioritises the interests of the 
human community. Of course it is important to admit that some environmental ethicists 
are anthropocentric in approach while others are not.  
Traditionally, environmental ethics is partly informed by some needs of 
safeguarding the needs and interests of current and future generations. Attempts to 
consider the moral interests of future generations and the environment in themselves 
have been conspicuously inherent in traditional Western philosophical discourse. 
However, it is until recently when non-anthropocentric environmental ethical concerns 
began to be critically explored in the literature, as espoused in most debates on the 
need for environmental ethics in contemporary Western philosophy. In advancing this 
viewpoint, Arne Naess argues that “today, a leading responsibility of humankind is the 
responsibility for future generations; that we hand down a planet with resources as 
great as we found in our own generations. But we also have a responsibility for future 
living creatures in general” (Naess, 2002: 102). Thus, the need to safeguard the needs 
of current and future generations as well as the interests of other non-rational creations 
in their own right remains at the core of contemporary environmental ethics in the 
Western world.  
Non-anthropocentric environmental ethics, the form of environmental ethics 
that I rather prefer in place of anthropocentrism attempts to extend moral consideration 
beyond the human community to include other communities of non-human beings 
including non-animate reality. Environmental ethics according to Ojomo (2011: 103) 
therefore, examines the moral basis of environmental responsibility. It is also important 
to note that environmental ethics is not limited to non-anthropocentric environmental 
ethics alone which is just one form of environmental ethics. However, the fundamental 
question of whether both nonhuman animals and non-animate forms of reality should 
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be considered in debates on environmental ethics is also very tricky and highly 
controversial. The place and value that should be given to non-animate forms of reality 
in environmental ethics, such as the physical world is not so clear. However, in 
essence, the non-physical world probably remains at the core of a meaningful and 
non-anthropocentric environmental ethics. Although it appears to be what Gilbert Ryle 
(1949: 17) calls a ‘category mistake’, the non-animate form of reality should be 
considered seriously in questions about environmental ethics as well. For example, 
non-animate form of reality like soils, rivers, water and air among others, possess not 
only aesthetic value, but that they also have intrinsic value such that human action can 
either affect them and their surrounding either negatively or positively. This view is 
substantiated by J. Baird Callicott’s argument for the land ethic. The land ethic as an 
approach to environmental ethics is concerned with such things as the anthropogenic 
pollution of air and water by individual and municipal wastes among other issues that 
affect the environment and humanity in general (Callicott, 2001: 204). Brennan also 
appreciates this perspective on environmental ethics that is based on the land ethic. 
Although Brennan (2010: 96) challenges it for being based on what he calls ‘ethical 
sentimentalism’, he also positively looks at the land ethic as being: 
one of the many different layers of moral codes within a larger range of codes, all of 
which apply to us since it is possible to urge protection of ecological wholes and also 
respect for human individuals then, this looks like an ethic that can be environmental 
without being either misanthropic or eco-fascist (Brennan, 2010: 96). 
So, the land ethic approach to environmental ethics takes on board the inherent 
value and interests of human beings as well as those of the environment, including 
non-animate forms of reality. This is why Robert Elliot looks at non-animate form of 
reality as wild nature, and asserts the view that: 
Wild nature has intrinsic value, which gives rise to obligations to preserve it and 
to restore it. In other words, our obligations towards wild nature derive, in large 
part from the intrinsic value that it possesses . . . which is the value [it has] apart 
from satisfying human interests. . . (Elliot, 1997: 01).  
The value that the natural environment has apart from that of satisfying humanity alone 
is one of the major bases for the justification of much of recent non-anthropocentric 
environmental ethics. It calls for the moral consideration of human action in so far as 
humanity interacts with the natural environment. This is the philosophy guiding and 
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shaping the greater part of contemporary Western perspectives to environmental 
ethics.  
Environmental ethics has therefore become a serious normative ethical and 
non-anthropocentric attempt to make ethics transcend human communities. This view 
is supported by John O’Neill who argues that environmental ethics now tends to raise 
questions that go beyond purely human interests (O’Neill, 2001: 04). By normative 
environmental ethics, I refer to a form of non-anthropocentric environmental ethics that 
attempts to shift from the traditional human-centred approach to additional ethical 
issues. I therefore take Elliot’s understanding that “an important aspect of the 
development of normative environmental ethics has been the move from human 
centred to the non-human centred concerns” (Elliot, 2001: 181). As a normative ethical 
discipline, environmental ethics as I consider it here as now a non-anthropocentric 
perspective, attempts to critically examine concrete issues to do with how human 
beings ought to relate with nature or the natural environment. It also attempts to assess 
if in any way there ought to be an ethical relationship that is subject to moral scrutiny 
in such interaction. Of course, this is not the only conventional understanding of 
environmental ethics since environmental ethics could be comprehended from either 
the anthropocentric or the non-anthropocentric perspective. However, in this article, I 
adopt the operational broader understanding of environmental ethics as an inquiry into 
how human beings ought to relate with their surrounding from both the anthropocentric 
and non-anthropocentric perspectives. Even Elliot appreciates the way in which 
environmental ethics could be shaped by these two perspectives as he notes that: 
A human-centred environmental ethic may go quite a way toward articulating the 
moral responses many may have to environmental damage and destruction. But, 
not everyone who endorses environmentalist policies is moved merely by 
human-centred considerations. Indeed, some might regard them as 
comparatively insignificant and others would regard them as no more significant 
than considerations that extend beyond the interests of our own species (Elliot, 
2001: 179). 
On the other hand, the reason why environmental ethics needs to be considered 
without necessarily prioritising human interests alone is that human actions on their 
surrounding natural environment affects not only fellow human species alone. Rather, 
human actions can also have long term effects on other sentient beings and non 
sentient reality that constitutes the environment. This is why I consider both 
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anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric environmental ethics as having a broadly 
normative function towards both humanity and the environment. O’Neill also sees 
normative ethics as crucial to environmental ethics because it “deal[s] with particular 
ethical claims including those at the centre of environmental ethics concerning 
environmental change and its effects on human and non-human beings” (O’Neill, 
2001: 164). 
Practically, environmental ethics challenges humanity to critically rethink its 
actions with regard to how they can affect and change human and nonhuman 
communities. As Warwick Fox sees it, “environmental ethics is, or at least ought to be 
concerned with examining any or all ethical questions that arise with respect to a moral 
agent’s interaction with any or all aspects of the world around her or him” (Fox, 2000: 
01). Unlike other applied ethical disciplines like medical ethics and business ethics 
that are limited to human communities and the welfare and wellbeing of fellow human 
moral agents, environmental ethics goes beyond in its approach and attempts to be 
holistic in so far as it takes on board all there is in evaluating human action. This 
thinking is based on the assumption that the interests of both the human beings and 
the environment must be equal.   
While the application, evaluation and justification of human ethical conduct has 
been traditionally limited to human communities, as Boss (2008:735) observes, 
environmental ethics as a new applied ethical discourse from a non-anthropocentric 
Western philosophical perspective, attempts to transcend the human community to 
encompass the whole of the environment, or nature. In this article, I use the terms 
‘environment’ and ‘nature’ interchangeably to mean the natural environment in 
general. Of course, one fundamental question that needs to be understood within the 
context of environmental ethics is the question of why nature or the environment in 
particular? This question has to be addressed in terms of the justification of extending 
morality beyond the human community to include the environment at large. Peterson 
attempts to come close to this justification as he observes that, “nature carries the 
weight of projected human fears and hopes, the marks of history and political conflict, 
the grounds for moral legitimation or condemnation” (Peterson, 2001: 01). Following 
this thinking, it seems apparent that what it means to be human is determined by 
appreciating the mutual relationship of humanity with nature in general. Hence, it is 
reasonable to sustain the thinking that: 
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Not only are ideas of humanness and of nature wrapped up with each other, but, 
they also shape ethical systems and practices. Questions such as what counts 
as human, what does not, and what is natural or unnatural do not simply feed 
philosophical debates but help determine moral and political priorities, patterns 
of behaviour, and institutional structures (Peterson, 2001: 01).  
Despite this justification for non-anthropocentric environmental ethics being based on 
a somewhat human centred ethical thinking, it is reasonable to take Peterson’s 
justification for environmental ethics as it considers the relationship between human 
beings and the natural environment. Peterson’s argument takes into account the 
principle of equal consideration of interests between human beings and the natural 
environment.  
Environmental ethics is also justified on the basis upon which it attempts to 
recognise the interconnection between human beings and other nonhuman being and 
the natural environment at large. This is why Baxter thinks that: 
human beings are part of the natural world, not set over and above it, which 
means that human beings remain integrated into ecological systems, local and 
global, even while they change them, intentionally or otherwise. This fact of 
ecological interconnectedness is the basis upon which environmentalists have 
tried to develop ethical systems which attribute to human beings various moral 
responsibilities towards, and with respect to, the rest of nature (Baxter, 2007: 
95). 
This interconnectedness between human beings and nature is visible in African 
environmental ethics that I will consider later.  Although focussing on the pre-colonial 
metaphysical outlook, Tangwa (2006) alludes to this interconnectedness between 
humanity and the environment as he argues that “the pre-colonial traditional African 
metaphysical outlook can be described as eco-bio-communitarian, implying 
recognition and acceptance of interdependence and peaceful coexistence between 
earth, plants, animals, and humans” (Tangwa, 2006: 389).    
In spite of the shared argument by most radical non-anthropocentric 
environmental ethicists that human beings do not have the basis upon which they can 
have exclusive rights to use nature to further their ends however they please, it is here 
noted that environmental ethical thinking can only make sense if and only if human 
beings relate with nature by recognising how interrelated they are, and how they could 
further such relationship. Otherwise an attempt to disconnect human beings from their 
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interconnectedness with nature is not sustainable and reasonable. Although 
anthropocentrists also accept this point, I therefore take as reasonable, the argument 
that human beings ought to recognise and appreciate their interconnectedness  with 
the environment, especially with other animate and non-animate reality so as to 
safeguard their well-being and that of the environment as well. This perspective is 
what I consider as a reasonable version of anthropocentric thinking. On the other 
hand, my argument for appreciating and accepting non-anthropocentric environmental 
ethics as more reasonable is centred on the premise that, apart from serving human 
interests, the environment deserves to be given moral consideration as an end in itself 
that also stands to further its purpose in life. While looking at the contribution of African 
Philosophy, thought and practice to environmental ethics, Kelvin Behrens submits the 
argument that “an obvious implication of any position that holds that everything in 
nature is interdependent is that the well-being and continued survival of human beings 
is dependent on the health of the environment” (Behrens, 2011: 54). Although this 
approach to environmental ethics that is centred on interconnectedness sounds 
anthropocentric, it is reasonable and acceptable since it safeguards the interests of 
both human beings and the natural environment.   
The Fallacy of a NewEnvironmental Ethics 
While I argue that environmental ethics is relatively inherent throughout the 
history of Western philosophy, particularly in ancient Greek thinking I take as 
suspicious some contemporary Western as well as some African philosophical 
perspectives that take it to be a relatively new discourse of the twentieth century 
(O’Neill, 1993: 1). This view by O’Neill is also shared by Tangwa as he sees the 
development of environmental ethics as a result of “the increasing realisation of the 
very grave dangers posed to our entire planet by what might be described as the most 
successful aspect of Western culture, namely, its science and technology” (Tangwa, 
2006: 387). This perspective on environmental ethics is influenced by some 
contemporary Western viewpoints of environmental ethics that I challenge in the next 
section. Boss subscribes to this contemporary Western position that “the 
environmental ethics movement is a relative newcomer on the philosophical scene” 
(Boss, 2008: 735). The view that environmental philosophy is a new thinking is 
advanced by the way some contemporary environmental philosophers have reacted 
to the increasing global environmental challenges facing the globe such as water and 
air pollution, extinction of rare species, heat waves, and global warming. Overall, a 
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considerable body of literature on environmental ethics has been identified in Western 
contemporary environmental ethics. The works of Lynn White (1974), O’Neill (1993 
and 2001), Singer (1985), Naess (2002), Fox (2000), Elliot (1997 and 2001) and 
Callicott (2001), among others, almost suggesting that environmental ethics could be 
related to the current environmental challenges facing the globe. These environmental 
challenges are what most of these thinkers have in mind. However, contrary to the 
standpoint by O’Neill, Tangwa and Boss, I argue and maintain that environmental 
ethics, broadly understood, has always emerged as an ethical philosophical discipline 
that challenges humanity to rethink their position within the cosmic world. 
Another dimension to justify the existence of contemporary Western 
environmental ethics is explored by Fox who attributes the development of 
environmental ethics to the emergence of the applied sciences after the post-Big Bang 
physics, post-Darwinian evolutionary biology and ecology where humanity has been 
led to question the ways in which it dwells upon the Earth (Fox, 2000: 01). Hence, for 
him, “taken together, these major theoretical and practical challenges to our previous 
self understandings and ways of living have led, just since the 1970s, to the 
development of an emerging field of philosophy known as ‘environmental philosophy’ 
or more precisely ‘environmental ethics’” (Fox, 2000: 01).     
The view that environmental ethics is a new phenomenon is a fallacy resulting from 
the premise that environmental ethics is a response to some environmental crisis. Just 
like Fox who sees environmental ethics as a newcomer, Varner thinks that “the 
environmental crisis forces us to re-examine our concept of moral standing. 
Traditionally, it is claimed, only human beings were thought to matter, morally 
speaking; but the environmental crisis will not be resolved until we break with tradition 
and acknowledge that nonhuman nature also has moral standing” (Varner, 1998: 05). 
Here, the problem of conceiving environmental ethics as a response to the 
environmental crisis and deterioration is the assumption implied in Varner’s argument 
that, prior to the purported environmental crisis humanity had no conception of 
environmental ethics.In view of the foregoing thus, environmental ethics as I will 
consider itshortly must be understood as part and parcel of human beings’ moral 
obligation towards nature and that this view is not new among some ancient Greek 
thinkers. Considering the history of philosophy and how is it related to environmental 
ethics as I will do in the next section, I will observe and argue that both anthropocentric 
and non-anthropocentric environmental ethics characteristic of ancient Greek 
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philosophy, which is what I have in mind, take into consideration the mutual 
interconnectedness among human beings and also the interconnection between 
humanity and the natural environment. 
 
Situating Environmental Ethics in Ancient Greek Philosophy 
In thisparticularsection, I will consider environmental ethics broadly from its 
anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric standpoints and situate it in ancient Greek 
philosophical thinking. I will critically consider the extent to which environmental ethical 
thinking could be meaningfully talked of from classical Greek philosophy to 
contemporary Western philosophical perspectives. Following this pursuit, I will 
therefore submit the conclusion that, contrary to some philosophical perspectives that 
environmental ethics is relatively a new dispensation of the contemporary period, 
environmental ethics has traditionally been an inseparable part and parcel of the story 
and development of philosophy from the ancient philosophical period to contemporary 
philosophical thinking. 
The ancient Greek period that I consider in this section is the stretching from 
around the sixth century B.C up to around the Aristotelian era. I argue that 
environmental ethical thinking in ancient Greek philosophy, which I also call ‘classical 
Greek philosophy’ has been downplayed yet it is worth seriously considering despite 
its fairly anthropocentric strand. I also note that environmental ethical thinking in 
ancient Greek philosophy could be the basis for understanding the development of a 
sound environmental ethics. Although most historians of philosophy portray much of 
ancient Greek philosophy as silent about the need for an environmental ethics that 
would go towards safeguarding the environment, it cannot be totally disregarded as 
irrelevant towards influencing the development of environmental ethics. Citing Homer 
and Plato, Brian Coman comes to the conclusion that “there have always been 
individuals with a concern and interest in the state of health and of the beauty of our 
environment. [Hence] what has changed in recent times (the last two hundred years 
or so) has been the general philosophy underlying such interests and concerns” 
(Coman, 2006: 55). In this regard, I therefore consider some of the most nfluential 
ancient Greek thinkers such as Thales, Plato and Aristotle as contributing to the 
development of meaningful environmental ethics. 
On the other hand, O’Connor examines the development of ancient Greek 
philosophical thinking and comes to the conclusion that “the earliest philosophical 
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speculations were attempts to explain the origin and structure of the physical world” 
(O’Connor, 1964: 02). Of course, O’Connor’s claim about the general slant of classical 
philosophical thinking is true. However, this is not enough basis and justification for 
the total dismissal of ancient or classical Greek philosophy as not being relevant to 
environmental ethical thinking. Carone for example, supports the thinking that I 
develop in my argument that environmental philosophers have not been fair in 
downplaying ancient Greek philosophy’s contribution to environmental ethical thinking. 
She argues that much of what comes from the works of ancient Greek thinkers like 
Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus and Parmenides can be regarded as a 
“hylozoistic worldview, in which matter (hylō) and life (zōē) are inseparable” (Carone, 
2001: 68). The strength of Carone’s argument is seen in the way Thales, Anaximander 
and Anaximenes attempt to explain the basic form of substance from a naturalistic 
perspective.   
In the light of Carone’s noteworthy observation, it is interesting to note that 
much of what is contained in most of ancient Greek philosophical attempts, particularly 
pre-Socratic philosophy, are attempts to place the human person at the centre of the 
universe and see the extent to which humanity could explore his surrounding and 
understand “‘what things really are?’ and ‘How we can explain the process of change 
in things’” (Stumpf and Feiser, 2008: 05). This perspective is in itself influential to the 
shaping of environmental ethics, particularly one that is anthropocentric. It is only 
unfortunate that the bulk of the literature that is available on classical or ancient 
philosophy is silent on the import of environmental ethical thinking in these classical 
thinkers. However, this silence should not be taken to imply that ancient philosophical 
thinking is not conscious of environmental ethics. It is only that it is largely 
anthropocentric in outlook which is not a problem as such. Even if classical Greek 
philosophy is by and large informed by the need to consider the human person as 
rationally and morally superior to all other non-human beings and nature, still, there 
are some exceptions that make it possible for us to look at classical Greek philosophy 
as conscious of and informing both anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric 
environmental ethics. The problem is only that environmental ethical thinking in such 
era has not been critically explored further particularly in the light of how the 
philosophical articulations of these ancient thinkers could be understood from non-
anthropocentric environmental ethical perspectives.  
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Considering the attempts of the works of eminent thinkers in ancient philosophy 
such as Thales (ca585 BC), Anaximander (ca610-546 BC), Anaximenes (585-528 
BC), Pythagoras (ca 570-497 BC), Heraclitus (ca 540-480 BC), Parmenides (ca510), 
and Zeno (ca 489), most historians of philosophy are tempted to assume that early 
ancient Greek philosophy started as just speculative and independent attempts, but 
that were not in any way close to coming up with clear and consistent environmental 
ethical theories like the one witnessed in recent Western philosophical attempts. I 
therefore note that although these metaphysically minded philosophers raised 
pertinent metaphysical questions about how they could understand their entire 
cosmos, they are unfairly regarded as having contributed little in terms of real efforts 
to bring such metaphysical questions towards addressing environmental ethical 
issues. Traditionally, environmental ethics has not been attributed to these thinkers 
although “they shared an outlook that truly marks the beginning of philosophical 
inquiry” (Cohen, Curd and Reeve, 2011: 02).  
In Thales for example, I find some serious environmental ethical attempts to 
bridge the gap between animate and inanimate reality. The traditional division between 
animate and non animate reality is one of the major support for anthropocentric 
thinking. However, such a division is not characteristic of Thales’s thinking. Jonathan 
Barnes maintains that when Thales asserts that inanimate things like magnets have a 
soul (psuché) and that everything is full of spirits, he succeeds in putting forth the 
argument that the difference between animate and non-animate reality is an illusion 
(Barnes, 1982: 09). This in itself, I find to be a very strong argument for the 
development of non-anthropocentric environmental ethics to be found in ancient 
philosophy, particularly in Thales because of the way in which he attempts to close the 
gap between the moral status of animals and  that of non-human animals. A similar 
attempt is also prominent in the African vitalist tradition that I explore elsewhere (See 
also, Chemhuru, 2014: 73-88).     
Besides these pre-Socratic metaphysically minded thinkers in ancient Greek 
philosophy, there are some prominent figures in early classical Greek philosophy like 
Plato and Aristotle who attempted to address serious environmental ethical questions. 
These thinkers, however, have rather been ignored and downplayed in terms of how 
they are critical of the extent to which humanity could go towards giving nature its 
intrinsic value. Although the phrase ‘intrinsic value’ has a variety of senses attached 
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to it, I take and make use of the one that O’Neill  defined simply as the value of a thing 
as an end in itself (O’Neill, 2001: 164). 
Notwithstanding the fact that both Plato and Aristotle are very much critical 
about how human beings ought to live well, they contribute to environmental ethics. 
Although they are sometimes read as eudaemonists, still with regard to the question 
of how humans should relate with nature, the bulk of their writing, particularly Aristotle, 
suggests a fairly hierarchy based and anthropocentric environmental ethics. Perhaps 
this is influenced by their privileging of humanity with the faculty of reason that 
humanity is endowed with as opposed to all other creatures on the planet earth. In 
essence, while anthropocentric ethical questions mainly characterise much of the 
discussion of Plato and Aristotle’s social and political philosophy, on the other hand, 
non-anthropocentric environmental ethics as a philosophical inquiry into how human 
beings ought to relate equally with their surrounding has not been critically explored 
with the attempt to reconcile that traditional dominance of humanity over the natural 
environment. 
Much of Plato’s social thinking centres on the fact that human persons are 
endowed with the faculty of reason (See Plato, 440a-441c: 104-5). Hence, on the basis 
of the realisation that human persons are rationally superior to other nonhuman 
creatures, I find such rational superiority to have greatly shaped the assumed moral 
superiority that humans have traditionally claimed over nonhuman animals and nature 
in general. Notwithstanding the fact that Plato’s philosophy contributes largely to an 
anthropocentric environmental ethics, still I find him as having a lot to offer to 
environmental ethics. In that regard Coman submits the following argument that I find 
to be worth considering: 
In the west, from the time of Homer and Plato up to the 18th century 
Enlightenment, it was considered as a given that humans and human destinies 
were the central reference point through which meaning and purpose could be 
given to the word- indeed, to the universe. In the Platonic philosophy . . . there 
was a close correspondence between macrocosm and microcosm- that is to say, 
between the way the material world is structured and the way the human creature 
is structured (Coman, 2006: 55-56). 
Aristotle even buys the same kind of thinking as he would even go further to the 
extent of identifying a hierarchy of moral priority between humanity, nonhuman 
animals and the natural world of plants as he boldly argues: 
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In like manner we may infer that, after the birth of animals, plants exist for their 
sake, and that the other animals exist for the sake of man, the tame for use and 
food, the wild, if not all, at least the greater part of them, for food, and for the 
provision of clothing and various instruments. Now, if nature makes nothing 
incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all 
animals for the sake of man (Aristotle, Politics, 1256b: 15-22).  
This kind of thinking supports the traditional distinction and division between humanity 
and nature and thereby contributing to the dominance of human beings over the 
environment although this rather anthropocentric view of environmental ethics is partly 
acceptable as a form of environmentalism in traditional Western and African 
philosophy as well. Singer (1985: 477) also contends that it is this view which has been 
predominant in the Western philosophical tradition. For Singer, Aristotle is among the 
founders of this tradition in Western philosophical thinking that holds the view that 
human beings naturally ought to claim dominion over the natural environment. Aristotle 
thus, shares the thinking of most early Greek and Western philosophers who regard 
nature as some form of a hierarchy, in which the function of the less rational and hence 
the less perfect beings was to serve the more rational and more perfect (Singer, 1985: 
477). While it remains mainly anthropocentric, the attempt to see a hierarchy in terms 
of moral priority in Aristotle’s thinking shows some effort in being conscious of 
environmental ethics. The basis for accepting such thinking is centred on the 
understanding of environmental ethics as largely embracing both anthropocentric and 
non-anthropocentric environmental ethics which is not a problem.  
Notwithstanding Plato and Aristotle’s views as well as other dimensions from 
the classical philosophical tradition, their views on ethical thinking may not be totally 
dismissed as not having contributed to the development of environmental ethics. In 
other words, my argument here is not that ancient philosophy is not unconscious about 
environmental ethics. But that most of what emanates from ancient Greek philosophy 
has traditionally been presented as not metaphysically oriented towards 
environmental ethics in the same way that I will see in African philosophy. While not 
being exhaustive on all the ‘Great Thinkers on the Environment’, Cooper (2001) for 
example looks at Aristotle as one of the greatest classical environmental thinkers who 
has a global influence on environmental thought and action. Cooper claims:   
Aristotle was not, of course, an environmental scientist or philosopher in the 
contemporary sense . . . [since] the ‘eco-crises’ which have stimulated recent 
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environmental concern were happily unknown in ancient Greece . . .it is clear 
however that Aristotle experienced and urged a profound regard for the living 
world and several elements of his thinking prove attractive to contemporary 
environmental thought (Cooper, 2001: 12).  
Even Aristotle’s hierarchy based ethical environmental thinking that I alluded to earlier 
serves to show that Aristotle is ready to embrace an environmental ethical thinking 
that takes into consideration the interests of both animate and non animate reality, but 
of course taking into account the moral hierarchy of these. Aristotle therefore, stands 
as one of the earliest thinkers on environmental ethics in ancient philosophy although 
in the broader understanding of ‘environmental ethics’ as inclusive of 
anthropocentrism. Just as the way ancient philosophy laid the ground for the 
development of serious philosophical thinking later, the development of environmental 
ethics could have been positively influenced by ancient environmental ethical thinking, 
particularly that of Aristotle.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article, I submit the argument that, despite its significant contribution to 
speculative philosophy based on freethinking, ancient Greek philosophy also 
influences the development of environmental ethical thinking in general. In particular, 
I have focussed on environmental ethical thinking as implicit in ancient Greek 
Philosophical thinking.Even Coman admits that “we may say at the outset, that whilst 
the environmental movement is of recent origin (it really got underway in the 1960s), 
some forms of environmentalism are as old as Western civilisation itself” (Coman, 
2006: 55). Although I also admit that some ancient Greek philosophers were divided 
with regard to the moral value of non-human nature (Boss, 2008: 736), above all, 
ancient Greek philosophy serves to lay the ground for the development of 
environmental ethics.     
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